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THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
KLAUS E. KNORRf
THE United States is engaged in a determined effort to resurrect a
world trading system capable of contributing to a high and stable
level of real income throughout the world. The productive powers of
mankind, it is emphasized, are enormous. Yet to produce ma.ximum
benefit, these powers musi be applied fully and economically. The
intermittent under-employment of resources characteristic of the
business cycle must be prevented as far as possible by co-ordinated
policies aiming at high and stable levels of production. Economic
resource utilization must be promoted by an intelligent division of
labor which encourages production where it is cheapest in terms of
economic effort. International trade is the basis upon which interna-
tional division of labor rests.
To be sure, the United States program does not aim at a rgime of
free trade and laissez faire. It is realized that the freedom of action of
nations is limited "by what exists and by what can be agreed upon." I
All countries are determined to maintain or create certain important
industries by interference with the free market. It is also realized that,
under present conditions, the free play of market forces often produces
socially undesirable results. The Bretton Woods Agreement and the
United States Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employ-
ment contain numerous provisions for legitimate intervention in the
free market. But within limits of practicability and prudence, it is
suggested that the free price mechanism be given full scope to direct
the flow of goods, services, and investment capital because this mech-
anism tends to make for optimum resource allocation and hence for
maximum productivity.
The United States, therefore, proposes that the nations join in
national and international efforts to release world trade from obstruc-
tions and excessive restraints. In addition to trade barriers of various
kinds imposed by governments and the problem of moderating the
fluctuations of the business cycle, the United States Trade Proposals
single out two problem areas: (1) restrictions imposed by private
business enterprises on the international flow of goods, and (2) the
disorder and the fear of disorder in the markets of certain primary com-
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modities which in the past led to restrictive expedients and contributed
to the disintegration of world trade.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
In its endeavor to liberate world trade from immoderate restrictions,
the United States government has expressed its concern over "activi-
ties on the part of private commercial enterprises which have the
effect or purpose of restraining international trade, restraining access
to international markets, or of fostering monopolistic controls in
international trade." 2 To dismantle or moderate trade barriers im-
posed by governments would indeed be illogical if private business
enterprises remained free to maintain trade restrictions of their own
and thereby counteract the expansive effect expected from the reduc-
tion of governmental restrictions.
Attention is focused on international cartels, i.e., arrangements
between independent enterprises in two or more countries for the
purpose of submitting their competitive activities to some form of
common control. Eliminating or curtailing competition is a means of
obtaining higher net returns to producers or sellers than would accrue
in the absence of cartelization. Given a sufficient degree of monopo-
listic control over the industry concerned, the cartel can augment
profits by manipulating prices, either directly by price-fixing or indi-
rectly by adjusting supply to current demand. Since the unit price
desired is higher than the free-market price, "adjustment" of supply
to demand involves in the long run restriction of supplies. However,
because the financial and managerial independence of the members is
preserved and the monopoly power enjoyed is rarely perfect, interna-
tional cartels do not permit the maximization of monopoly profits
which, in theory, can be attained by the single monopolist.
The forms assumed and the methods employed by international
cartels are varied. National and/or designated foreign markets may
be assigned entirely or partially to individual members or to national
cartel organizations. Effective competition is thus precluded except
possibly for special areas within which freedom of action is preserved.
Minimum prices or uniform sales prices may be set by the international
cartel, and sometimes common selling agencies are established with
orders pooled and allocated according to previously agreed foi-mulae.
Quota agreements often limit members to definite percentage shares
in the total production or export volume periodically fixed by the
cartel. Additions to output capacity or the introduction of new prod-
ucts may be limited. Occasionally, profit-sharing arrangements are
undertaken. Agreements on patent licenses are frequently combined
with restrictive practices because of the facility with which legal action
2. Id. at 26.
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can be taken for infringement of patent rights, the license being termi-
nated as soon as the other party violates other provisions of the agree-
ment that divide markets or fEx quotas. The specific method and form
adopted by an international cartel depends largely upon the character
of the industry and its products, the degree of monopoly power enjoyed,
internal cohesion, and the attitude of the respective governments.
Not all industries are adapted to cartelization, national or interna-
tional. Conditions are most suitable where the products are compara-
tively homogeneous and where the number of independent concerns is
small. Concentration of production in relatively few enterprises is
characteristic of capital-intensive industries which operate under
conditions of sharply decreasing costs as the output volume increases.
It is also encouraged when tied to the exploitation of rare natural re-
sources. International cartels have been particularly frequent, there-
fore, in many mining and refining industries (copper, zinc, lead, alumi-
num, steel, petroleum, potash, etc.) and in industries manufacturing
such products as chemicals and drugs, cement, linoleum, wood pulp
and paper, plate glass and bottles, incandescent lamps, electrical
cables, etc.
International cartels are unstable organizations often breaking down
intermittently and being reformed, with changing membership and
control methods. They are born and they die both during depressions
and in times of prosperity. Though existing prior to World War I,
they greatly increased in number and scope during the intervar period.
Their creation might be simply explained on the ground that, in the
pursuit of maximum profits, entrepreneurs will naturally seek to com-
bine for the purpose of limiting free competition. That is a plausible
hypothesis. Yet more specific reasons can be cited for the recent large-
scale emergence of cartels.
Industrial combinations of all kinds are characteristic outgrowths of
the increasing tendency toward the concentration of production in
large, heavily-capitalized enterprises which seldom face the smooth
and fluid process of perfect competition described in economic text-
books.3 Imperfect and especially monopolistic competition are ac-
companied by considerable waste and risk. Confronted with shrunken
demand in times of depression or with conditions of surplus output
facilities 4 in the industry, competitive adjustment is difficult and
painful in industries with large investments in highly specific capital
3. See CANADA-D ITERNATioNaL CARTELS (Rep. of Comm'r, Combined Investiga-
tion Act, 1945) 55-6.
4. Surplus production capacity in this sense is to be defined as facilities in excec of
reserves required in boom times. But under conditions of a markedly fluctuating businezs
cycle, the magnitude of the reserve capacity required is, of course, reflected in a p~rma-
nent burden of high fixed costs.
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goods. The difficulty becomes extreme when demand for the product
is rather inelastic to price as is true for industrial raw materials and
semi-manufactures and many durable manufactured goods. Falling
prices and profits do not result in curtailed production schedules or in
the disinvestment of redundant capacity. Instead there is a strong
tendency to struggle for survival and to continue production as long
as prices cover direct costs. In other words, the equilibrating forces of
the free market fail to work automatically and speedily. Such circum-
stances impart an inevitable desire to escape from unregulated compe-
tition through government intervention (tariffs, import quotas) or
private business agreements (cartels) or both.
Viewed historically, cartelization received a strong impetus from
the overexpansion of many industries during World War I and the
postwar boom, the progressive concentration of industrial enterprise
and financial control in the 1920's, and the severity of the Great De-
pression. International cartelization was greatly facilitated by the
spread of national monopolistic combinations, in turn encouraged by
the rapid growth of tariffs, foreign exchange control and other trade
barriers and the friendly or tolerant attitude of many governments.
In the early 1930's, indeed, compulsory cartelization made its appear-
ance in Japan, Germany, Italy, and elsewhere. Government-backed
schemes of regulating large sections of foreign trade by means of private
business arrangements were officially discussed by France and Germany
and are tellingly epitomized by the Diisseldorf Agreement of March,
1939, between the Federation of British Industries and the Reichs-
gruppe Industrie.5 This astonishing agreement envisaged the replace-
ment of "destructive competition" by a comprehensive series of private
business agreements between German and British groups.
The economic effects 6 of international cartel practices cannot be
assessed with precision; generalized conclusions must remain vague
and tentative. This results not only from our lack of exact knowledge
as to what would have happened,to an industry in the absence of car-
telization. It also follows from the facts that different industries
possess different characteristics, that international cartels pursued
different methods of abating competition and that, even when the
same methods are employed, they are not applied with identical rigor
and thus do not produce exactly the same effects. Nevertheless de-
ductive calculation based on economic principles and inductive reason-
5. HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1945) 402-4.
6. Political implications and effects are disregarded in this paper. Their importance
has been somewhat exaggerated of late. The United States Trade Proposals rightly base
their case against international cartels on economic and commercial considerations. For a
reasonable discussion of the political and security aspects of the problem see HEXNEit,
op. cit. supra note 5, at c. 8; Mason, The Future of International Cartels (1944) 22 FoRviGN
AFFAIRS 604, 610-4.
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ing based on such case studies as are available justify certain inferences
on the general consequences of restrictive cartel practices.
There is no doubt that cartel practices, which reduce or abolish com-
petition, lead to monopolistic pricing and that the monopolistic price
exceeds the competitive price. Higher prices mean diminished con-
sumption, the extent of the decrease being determined by the respon-
siveness of demand to price changes. Increased prices are in part
necessary to offset rising production costs. Most cartelized industries
operate under conditions of diminishing costs and, as outputs are
restricted, relatively invariable production costs rise per unit of output.
The protection of inefficient producers and the preservation of surplus
output capacity-both of which might eventually be eliminated in the
absence of cartelization-likewise tend to raise the average cost level
of the industry concerned. Furthermore, by retarding or blocking
investments in new and improved productive capacity and, possibly,
by discouraging technical progress,7 cartels tend to arrest or slow up a
secular decline in the average cost level which, under competitive condi-
tions, would lead to lower prices.
How high prices will be pushed in order to secure satisfactory profits
depends primarily upon the extent of monopoly power possessed by
the cartel, on the price elasticity of demand for the product in question,
and on the quality of cartel management. An international cartel
facing considerable competition by outsiders or by substitute products,
or selling an article for which the demand is highly responsive to price
changes, will follow a less ambitious price policy than one for which
the opposite conditions prevail. Cartel management is likely to reflect
the partly divergent interests of different members and, particularly,
cartel policies and decisions may embody compromises between the
desires of high-cost and of low-cost producers. It is wrong to assume,
moreover, that cartels will automatically follow a greedy policy even
if their monopolistic control is nearly complete. They way and some-
times do pursue a moderate policy.8 However, the temptation to fol-
low an exploitative policy is apparently hard to resist.
When suspending competition, cartel practices are also likely to
- have a restrictive effect on employment. To be sure, resources set free
because of restricted production might be employed in the competitive
section of the economy. But labor mobility is usually limited and the
transfer of specific capital goods rarely practicable. In depression,
moreover, the absorptive capacity of the competitive economy is very
small. Most likely, there will be a net deficit on employment account.
7. It is wrong to assume, however, that cartelization precludes an incentive tovard
enhancing productive efficiency. No matter what the price, producers can increase their
profits by minimizing costs. But under conditions of carteliztion, the fruits of technical
progress are far less likely to be passed on to the consumer than under free-market conditions.
8. HEXNER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 95.
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This tendency may be reinforced if cartels unduly limit the introduc-
tion of new techniques and products in order to protect old investments.
Cartels both national and international thus do not measure up to
the first test which must be applied to all planned intervention in the
world market; in the long run, they diminish rather than raise inter-
national income. Cartels have been defended on diverse grounds. It
has been said that they allow economies of distribution (especially
advertising), but on the whole such savings have counteracted cost-
raising tendencies only to a small. extent. It has been pointed out
that cartels have been formed in response to obstinate problems, such
as the existence of redundant production capacity. But there is no
case on record of an international cartel removing the excessive margin,
What benefit was conferred on investors was far outweighed by the
injury done to consumers. Cartels have been praised as agents of
stability in an unstable world. Yet rigid prices for a few selected prod-
ucts are scarcely of benefit when the general price level is subject to
violent fluctuations.9 Most international cartels, moreover, have been
unable to. moderate price gyrations except over short periods because
they were too unstable as organizations or because their concern over
achieving satisfactorily high prices led them to adopt a policy of short
supplies which could not be rapidly supplemented when demand
abruptly expanded. Professor Schumpeter ingeniously concedes the
restrictive effects of monopolistic enterprise, but believes that private
monopolies encourage technological progress because they furnish
insurance against the risks of long-range investing under competitive
conditions, and that society gains more from this stimulus to invest-
ment than it loses through restrictive practices.' 0 However, he cites no
evidence in support of this theory.
While it must be recognized that cartels are evolved in response to
acute industrial problems, it need not be conceded that the remedy is
socially desirable. If it benefits investors and promises security, it
does so primarily at the expense of consumers and to the detriment
of economic advancement. The planner of a reformed world trading
system-relatively unfettered, multilateral, and expansive-must
view international cartels as grave impedients. He need not single
them out with the fervor of the zealot for they are only one part of the
jungle of restrictive practices, private and governmental, which
flourished during the 1930's. But neither must he underestimate them.
International cartels restrict the flow of goods in international trade,
often more drastically than governmental trade barriers." Often they
9. Machlup, The Nature of the International Cartel Problem in EDWARDS ct al., A
CARTEL POLICY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS (1945) 1, 15.
10. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SocIALIsM, AND DEmocRAcY (1942) 84 et seq.
11. Especially when they provide for reciprocal protection of domestic markets. Where
the domestic market is fully reserved to the national member or group, the restrictive effect
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direct world trade away from the most efficient channels. Endeavoring
to achieve security by restrictive means, they impoverish the world by
diminishing the efficiency of resources employed in the industries con-
cerned. Since they are commonly formed by business enterprises in
industrially advanced nations, they also tend to shift the terms of
trade to the detriment of less industrialized countries. 1- In short, most
international cartel practices conflict with measures to liberalize inter-
national trade policy.
What can be done to stop or mitigate the restrictive practices of
international cartels? Or, more precisely, what program can be devised
that is at once satisfactory on economic principle and politically prac-
ticable? It is within this frame of reference that an answer must be
discovered. Projection of the perfect should not prejudice the achieve-
ment of the good. It is also clear that it is a workable international
solution which must be found. To be sure, unilateral action is by no
means useless if adopted by commercially important countries like
the United States and Great Britain. 13 Individual countries, however,
are affected by the practices of international cartels quite beyond their
legal reach. Uncoordinated national action is not enough. What is
required is an international remedy. 14
The search for a suitable solution should logically start with the
basic factors that stimulated the growth and spread of international
cartels. Indeed, it has been claimed that a simple program of interna-
tional "trust-busting" will scarcely be accepted and, if accepted, will
not work unless these underlying conditions are duly taken into ac-
count.' 5 There is some truth and wisdom in this contention. Among
the motives propelling cartelization, a distinction must be made
between the desire to mulct the consumer and the more or less legiti-
mate desire for security. As far as the latter is concerned, to deny the
specific remedy of cartelization is to leave legitimate wants unsatisfied.
But the campaign against international cartels is only part of an inte-
grated program toward liberalizing and stabilizing world trade.
Provided the United States Trade Proposals are translated into
practice with reasonable success, the impetus toward international
equals that of a prohibitive tariff; where it is partially reserved, the effect is identical with
that of an import-quota system.
12. Terrill, Tle American Trade Proposals: Restrictie Business Pracltces (1946) 14
DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 455, 457.
13. Vigorous action against national and international businezs agreements in the
United States, the repeal of the Webb-Pomerene Act [40 STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 61
(1940)], and strong international competition by American firms would in many fields handi-
cap the operation of international cartels set up abroad. See Kreps, Experience vith Uri-
lateral Action Toward International Cartels in EDWARDS et al., op. cit. supra note 9, at 70,91-3.
14. Assistant Secretary of State Clayton, Prirate Barriers to Intlrn.tional Trade
(1945) 12 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 933, 935.
15. See, e.g., International Cartels (1944) 147 THE EcoNounsr 724.
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cartelization would automatically be weakened. If government trade
obstacles are substantially reduced, quota and preferential restrictions
largely dismantled, and foreign exchange control normally confined to
long-term capital transactions, the formation of national cartels would
be rendered more difficult, and some tendencies toward the over-
expansion of industries would be inhibited. 6 If the major industrial
nations manage to maintain employment at a high and stable level,
industries would be far more likely than before to enjoy high and stable
volumes of demand and relatively stable prices. It is also well to recall
that some cartels were the direct legacy of World War I and that
structural maladjustments arising out of the dislocations of war and
its aftermath should preferably be removed by international adjust-
ment plans that cannot be elaborated in the abstract. In a limited
number of cases, overexpanded raw materials industries may be sub-
jected to the correctives contemplated by intergovernmental com-
modity agreements.
But even such profound changes on the international economic
scene would leave unimpaired some powerful stimuli toward carteliza-
tion, and there would still be need for specific countermeasures. Pro-
losals have been advanced ranging from the categorical eradication of
all monopolistic enterprizes to a mere insistence on increased publicity
on international cartel agreements and policies. The radical demand
for outlawing all monopolies, often including plans for dissolving giant
corporations and the systematic deconcentration of industries, is obvi-
ously utopian and scarcely desirable. Responsible quarters consider
the elimination of all cartels outside the area of practical politics,
although such a sweeping step should not only seriously handicap at-
tempts at forming international cartels but also force greatly extended
competition in world trade. 17 On the other hand, establishing an inter-
national fact-gathering and -disseminating agency, though quite prac-
ticable, is not enough. Such an agency should find it difficult to secure
all pertinent information on cartel contracts and behavior, and what
publicity it could afford would surely not safeguard the public interest
against the abuse of cartel power.
Most proposals can be reduced to two types, one designed to curb
the restrictive practices of international business arrangements, the
other to establish public regulation of international cartel activities2
8
Compulsion is inherent in both alternatives. But, though an inter-
16. Governmental protectionism is often at least a partial cause of excess output ca-
pacity.'
17. See HOOVER,. INTERNATiONAL TRADE AND DoMEsTic EMPLOYMENT (1945) 75-6.
18. A comprehensive cartel program "could take the form either of an international
agreement to prohibit restrictive business practices in international trade or, alternatively,
the establishment of a body or bodies to supervise and control in the public interest the
activities of international cartels." Clayton, loc. cit. supra note 14.
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national solution is envisaged, there is general agreement that the
nations are unwilling to confer adequate powers on an international
body and that enforcement will necessarily remain with the individual
states. Accordingly, the practicable approach will involve parallel
international and national action. A suitable program must be ac-
cepted by an international conference, and such international institu-
tions set up as can be agreed upon. Each participating government
must then undertake to enforce the provisions of the convention within
its own jurisdiction.
The proponents of public regulation of international cartels aver
that cartel arrangements are here to stay and that they are indispen-
sable for dealing with industrial maladjustments. They admit, how-
ever, that control power is subject to serious abuse if vested in the
hands of private entrepreneurs. The remedy they suggest is to convert
cartels into useful instruments of public policy by placing them under
governmental supervision. Thus, it is urged that governments agree to
compel public registration and advance clearance of all international
business arrangements. National producers desiring to participate in
international cartels would have to file with a government bureau in-
formation about membership and the stipulations of the agreement
and secure governmental approval.
Compulsory registration affords an indispensable basis for adequate
publicity which must be the first step toward preventing the imposition
of private trade barriers. But it is the first step only. In other respects,
this scheme seems of dubious value. ,What is important is not only the
basic cartel agreement but also the manner in which it is applied.
Officials could not appraise the effects in advance. The possibility of
evasion is manifest. Formal control arrangements may be duly re-
corded and approved, while substantive policy may be largely deter-
mined by informal consultation. Adding an official observer to all
meetings of the control management does not suggest a notable im-
provement. Civil servants rarely have the technical competence re-
quired for effective supervision, and governments are too often subject
to pressure on the part of well-organized business groups. Mr. Clay-
ton's diagnosis is correct. Past attempts in various countries at gov-
ernmental control of business policies with respect to production and
price "have revealed a strong tendency for the principles and aims of
the regulated group to become those of the regulating authority." 9
That the machinery of government in most countries is ill-equipped
for this task is the chief weakness of all plans for preserving interna-
tional cartels under public supervision. This has prompted Sir William
Beveridge to make the curious suggestion that what is needed is "that
those who have the responsibility of conducting great and highly
19. ibid.
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organized industries should come to regard themselves as the agents
of a wider policy than that of their business." 20 Just how this can be
achieved, he adds, "can probably be learned only by experience." 21
Yet this fond hope is doomed to frustration unless human nature is
altered or the capitalistic system dissolved. The free-enterprise system
must rest squarely on the profit motive. Beyond that no more can be
expected from the entrepreneur than obedience to public laws. He
cannot be converted into a public servant by exhortation.
Two other objections can be directed against this type of scheme.
International cartels could be so regulated only under condition of
de facto agreement between the main exporting countries. Such agree-
ment might not easily be attained and, if it were, there would be con-
siderable danger of agreement substantially at the expense of the im-
porting countries. International friction might easily arise from such
a situation. To minimize this danger, the suggestion has been made to
transform international cartels into intergovernmental commodity
agreements and include net-importing countries in their operation.
This proposal may be worth considering with regard to raw materials
industries of exceptional structural maladjustment, provided an en-
tirely novel kind of intergovernmental commodity control is evolved.
In the past, such controls were basically as restrictive as international
cartels, and cartels have at least the saving feature of being far less
stable than government-sponsored restriction schemes.
The second type of remedy proposes to do away with international
cartels or with their restrictive policies. The absolute banning of all
international business agreements is incomparably the more clear-cut
solution. It should be easy to enforce since no formidable problem of
definition exists. Yet there seems to be scant belief that so radical
a step is practicable on an international scale. The method also has
the drawback of outlawing international business agreements which
are free of restrictive features. For example, if uncontaminated by
restrictive marketing clauses, agreements for the international ex-
change of technological knowledge or for the establishment of informa-
tion bureaus appear to be decidedly useful.
An alternative is to forbid restrictive business practices in inter-
national trade without banning private'business agreements. Among
the restraints singled out for concerted prohibitory action would be
arrangements for fixing prices, restricting production or exports, allo-
cating territorial or functional markets, suppressing technology and
invention, and boycotting non-cartel members. The full inclusiveness
of this catalogue is a matter of detail. This is the core of the program
to which the United States has committed itself. The State Depart-
20. BEVERIDGE, FULL EmPLOY MENT IN A FREE SOCIETY (1945) 238.
21. Ibid.
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ment will seek "the concurrence of other countries in an agreement
prohibiting the participation of commercial enterprises in contracts
and combinations which restrain international trade, restrict access to
international markets, or foster monopolistic control in international
trade." 22
Beyond this statement of principle, the American campaign against
restrictive business practices is exceedingly flexible and far less detailed
than, for instance, the proposals on reforming intergovernmental
commodity arrangements. Two methods of effectuating the principle
have been considered. 23 One is to lay down, by international treaty, a
specific list of international business restrictions which the participat-
ing governments would regard as ipso facto violations, and which they
would take immediate action to remove, whenever demonstrably pur-
sued. According to the other method, participating governments would
regard such practices only as prima facie violations and would take
action only upon complaint of an international agency which would be
authorized to recommend but not to enforce such action.
The first method is unquestionably the more forthright, promising
far greater speed, certainty, and uniformity of action. The State De-
partment espouses it as a long-range objective but thinks it imprac-
ticable for immediate adoption. Aware of the diversity of legal sys-
terns, administrative procedures, traditions and interests of different
nations, the United States government doubts that many governments
would be willing to incorporate uniform definitions of restrictive carte
practices and statutory prohibitions in their existing laws. To push
such a program at this time, it is felt, would result in a very small
common denominator of accord. The State Department, therefore,
favors the alternative method which renders certain business practices
generally suspect and, upon definite proof that they have inimical
effects on the flow of trade in the individual case, would set in motion
machinery for remedial action.
Chapters IV and VI of the United States Trade Proposals suggest
the establishment by convention of an international code of rules with
a view to barring abuses of the power wielded by international cartels.
Certain practices will be enumerated and designated as suspect on
principle. Difficulties of definition may arise but should not prove
insuperable for the intended purposes. A Commission on Business
Practices will be set up as a subsidiary of the planned International
Trade Organization which, in turn, will be brought into some form of
relationship with the institutional structure of the United Nations.2 -*
The Commission will be empowered:
22. Clayton, loc. cit. supra note 14.
23. Terrill, supra note 12, at 45S, 490.
24. From Chapters IX and X of the Charter, it appears that such organizations must
first be established by intergovernmental agreement and thereafter integrated vith the
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(a) to receive complaints from any member (or, with the permis-
sion of the member, from commercial enterprises within its
jurisdiction who allege that their interests are affected) that the
objectives of the Organization are frustrated by a private inter-
national combination or agreement;
(b) to inquire into the cartel activities in question and request
members to provide information relevant to complaints;
(c) to recommend to the appropriate members remedial action,
such as divestiture, reorganization and dissolution, in accord-
ance with their respective laws and procedures;
(d) to request reports from members on their actions in implement-
ing such recommendations; and
(e) to issue reports on its activities.
In addition, the Commission will be authorized to conduct studies and
make recommendations concerning uniform standards of fair business
practices, the kinds of information which members should file with the
Organization, and appropriate intergovernmental arrangements for
the international exchange of technological information on a non-
discriminatory basis. Participating governments will have to commit
themselves to act upon the recommendations of the International
Trade Organization in accordance with their own domestic laws.
Sir Stafford Cripps is right in characterizing this proposal as "a very
mild and permissive form of trying to get rid of what has been acknowl-
edged . . . as being undesirable .... ," 25 Principled opponents of
cartelization would wish for something far more rigorous and clear-cut.
As outlined, the program is vague on essential points and, if accepted
in general, may succeed or fail in its purpose, depending upon the
actual degree of agreement and cooperation which can be realized in
the course of time. It is quite possible that it is wildly optimistic to
expect effective remedies from this kind of consultative and persuasive
technique and that the program "offers scope for the maximum of
- excited complaint and the minimum of prompt action." 21 But it is
easy to underestimate the persuasive force of institutionalized com-
plaints and to overestimate the necessity for prompt action. The
United Nations. ". . . [S]pecialized agencies, established by inter-governmental agreement
and having wide international responsibilities" in economic, social and related fields (Art.
57, par. 1) may enter into agreements with the Economic and Social Council "defining the
terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United
Nations ... ." (Art. 63, par. 1). However, the United Nations "shall, where appropriate,
initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized
agencies required. . . ." (Art. 59). In so far as the problem is susceptible to treatment by
an international code of rules, apart from an international agency, the Economic and Social
Council "may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with
respect to matters falling within its competence." (Art. 62, par. 3).
25. 417 H. C. DEB. (5th, ser. 1946) 499.
26. The Trade Proposals (1945) 149 THE EcoN oMIsT 853.
1108 [Vol. 55: 1097
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
American program has, on the other hand, the virtues of its vices. It is
pragmatic, tentative and elastic.
At this time, it would be premature to appraise the potential area of
international cooperation on this matter. Before the war, western and
central Europe were the main breeding ground and domicile of inter-
national cartels because they had the capital wealth to invest in the
types of industries particularly conducive to cartelization and because,
unlike the United States, there was no powerful and formalized "trust-
busting" tradition. Since German business will remain under Allied
control and will hardly, therefore, be one of the mainstays of inter-
national cartelization, much will depend on the attitude of the United
Kingdom and France. The state of French politics is in an unpre-
dictable flux at present. Yet there seems to be an unambiguous dispo-
sition among the leaders of the Socialist Party and the Popular Re-
publicans to collaborate with the United States in world economic
affairs. Great Britain is committed to support the principles of the
American program and, despite the Disseldorf Agreement, cannot be
said to be fundamentally pro-cartel.27 The ultimate attitude of these
two countries will largely depend on the intelligent solution of postwar
transition problems and the prospect and success of the United States
Trade Proposals. If they decide to support the program whole-
heartedly, most other important trading countries can be expected to
fall in line. In that event, the American approach toward the cartel
problem may facilitate greater progress than seems likely at first sight.
The flexibility of the American program extends in both directions.
Resting on a multiple-contingency basis, it provides for an "offensive
in depth." According to Chapter IV of the Proposals, members may
by mutual accord "cooperate in measures for the purpose of making
more effective any remedial order which has been issued by a duly
authorized agency of another member." This clause permits special
arrangements among individual members for enforcing anti-cartel
measures more severe than the totality of member countries is willing
to subscribe to. Such special arrangements may be quite effective.
There were not many international cartels that could have been or-
ganized or maintained against determined and concerted opposition on
the part of even a few important industrial powers. Finally, the Pro-
posals leave any member free to enforce within its own jurisdiction
any national statute or decree directed toward the elimination or pre-
vention of restrictive business agreements in international trade.
The United States proposals on international cartels merit approval.
Curbing restrictive business practices will not by itself bring about a
perfect world trading system. But it can significantly contribute to
27. Lewis, The Status of Cartels in Post-War Europe in EDwAuns et al., op. cit. supra
note 9, at 25, 28-33.
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the regeneration of the decaying prewar regime. As a rough blueprint,
the American program may be sadly disappointing to the economic
purist and utopian to the cynical "realist." But it comes close to the
maximum combination of the ideal and the feasible.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMIODITY AGREEMENTS
Both intergovernmental commodity arrangements and international
cartels were devised for the purpose of substituting for the anonymous
forces of the competitive world market deliberate control over produc-
tion, marketing, and sometimes prices. Restraint of competition is of
the essence of both instruments. The chief difference is that govern-
ments assume a more or less decisive role in the one, while the other
remains within the province of private enterprise.
Commodity agreements have been set up for a variety of reasons.
Some, for instance, were formed to prevent the depletion of exhaustible
natural resources (such as the conservation agreements on marine
animals: fur seals, halibut, sockeye salmon, whales). Others made
arrangements in the interest of public health (e.g., regulation of the
trade in narcotic drugs) or had primarily political objectives (e.g.,
the Anglo-American interim agreement on crude petroleum of 1944).
The most important class, however, is represented by agreements on
primary commodities which are in chronic oversupply. This is the
type dealt with in the United States Trade Proposals.
The problem at issue here is not that of short- or medium-range
price oscillations-another curse to primary producers. Such fluctua-
tions arise, on the demand side, from abrupt changes in per-capita
incomes and, on the supply side, from unpredictable changes in crop
yields. To confine the resulting price gyrations frequently was a sec-
ondary aim of prewar commodity arrangements. Their primary ob-
jective, however, was to lift a price level depressed by chronic excess
supplies, that is, by a fundamental maladjustment of the industry
concerned.
As pointed out previously, during the interwar period many impor-
tant primary industries suffered from chronic conditions of excess
supplies, directly affecting millions of small producers and workers and
many thousands of managers and investors. Structural maladjustment
of the industry was in each case the root cause of the trouble; the
world's capacity to produce the commodity exceeded the requirements
of the world market. In some fields overexpansion originated in the
economic dislocations of World War I (wheat, sugar). Extension of
capacity as well as of productivity usually followed technological ad-
vances such as improved mining machinery, development of hardier
plant varieties, increased use of fertilizers, and better animal breeds
and feeding diets. New means of transportation extended the location
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of mineral and agricultural production, and better packing and storage
methods permitted a larger proportion of production to reach the
final consumer. The gradual replacement of draught animals by motor
vehicles set free large areas for cultivating food cereals. The growth of
economic nationalism led to the uneconomic extension of production
behind protective shelters. Restrictive valorization schemes occasion-
ally stimulated new production under the temporary umbrella of
highly attractive prices (coffee, crude rubber). Sometimes, brief
periods of short supplies and boom prices resulted in an overcompen-
sated expansion of production.
Temporary maladjustments and unbalances are unavoidable in a
world of rapid economic, political and technological change, and in
many fields of production, especially in manufacturing industries, the
price mechanism of the free market sets forces in motion that tend to
reestablish equilibrium without undue delay and distress. When the
continued employment of surplus production facilities floods markets
and depresses prices, the postponement of further investments and/or
actual disinvestment induces a shift of resources into more profitable
fields. This process plus the stimulation of increased consumption by
low prices tends to readjust production and consumption capacities.
Unfortunately, many primary commodity markets do not conform
to this ideal pattern of stimulus and response. The ultimate demand
for most industrial raw materials, especially metals, is a joint demand.
Its responsiveness to price changes is usually negligible since the value
of one raw material (e.g., rubber) in proportion to the value of the
entire finished product (e.g., automobile) is exceedingly small. Lov
prices, therefore, fail to generate an increased volume of demand. The
magnitude of consumption is largely determined by fluctuations in
real incomes. On the other hand, the specific nature of resources in
capital-intensive primary industries (mines, plantations) makes their
transfer to alternative employment costly or impossible. Disinvest-
ment is tantamount to painful capital losses and, under the pressure
of high fixed costs, production is often maintained as long as prices
remain above prime costs. The result is that, except in the very long
run, adjustment takes place in price only. The discouragement of
new investments and the eventual bankruptcy of relatively inefficient
and financially weak enterprises is likely to produce readjustment in
the longer run, but the protracted interval is a slow and bitter process
of attrition. The markets of basic foodstuffs show roughly the same
defects. Rate of consumption is rather insensitive to price changes.
Confronted with a sagging price level, farmers of the omer-operator
type do not as a rule contract output. Indeed, the price elasticity of
supply may become inverse as producers try to maintain a minimum
income. Mobility of resources is generally low, particularly in Europe
and Asia where farming is not only a business but also a way of life.
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But even in the United States, the total crop acreage did not contract
during the Great Depression. In fact, it expanded each year from 1929
to 1932.28 Under laissez-faire conditions, therefore, agricultural crises
on account of overproduction tend to be severe and prolonged. Sur-
pluses are apt to become chronic.
Faced with such conditions, it is only natural that producers at-
tempt to evade the impasse of the competitive market. Where cir-
cumstances are favorable, national and international cartels may be
created. Yet this is rarely possible in industries composed of a great
multiplicity of independent producers. Their interests, in part di-
vergent, are difficult to reconcile and, should an effective restriction
scheme be set up, large advantages are likely to accrue to the out-
siders. Organized attempts at voluntary output restriction are in-
variably abortive. Pleas for government help are the next step. When
producers are organized in associations, political pressure re-enforces
persuasion. Nor is governmental assistance granted merely for po-
litical motives. Governments may genuinely conceive such relief to be
necessary in the general interest. Disposition to succor a depressed
industry will be in proportion to the numbers of producers and workers
involved. Especially in agriculture, the numbers may be large. In
industrialized countries with comparatively high-cost farm production,
governments are usually unwilling to permit their peasant commu-
nity to be decimated by foreign competition. In raw materials-
producing countries, frequently dependent on the exports of a few
primary products, a persistent depression of prices seriously affects
domestic prosperity, balance-of-payments position, fiscal revenues,
and, sometimes, political stability. The vast importance of sugar
prices to Cuba, tin prices to Bolivia, rubber prices to British Malaya,
wool prices to Australia, wheat prices to Canada, and coffee prices to
Brazil illustrates the point.
The incentive to help primary producers was strengthened when
the cyclical recession of consumption in the early 1930's added to the
plight of producers. Most remedies reflected the universal disposition
to follow a policy of sauve gui peut. Importing countries-many
already committed to agrarian protectionism-reserved their internal
markets to their own producers by high tariff walls, import quotas
and foreign exchange controls. Many governments granted direct
subsidies, debt and tax relief, etc. Exporting countries accorded direct
or indirect aid to dumping. By such unilateral action, each govern-
ment tried to shift the main burden of adjustment to other countries
with the over-all result of preserving uneconomic production, disrupt-
ing trade channels and, generally, contributing to the disintegration
of world trade.
28. SHEPHERD, AGRICULTURAL PRICE CONTROL (1945) 9.
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It is against this background that prewar commodity agreements
must be viewed. They constituted an alternative remedy. Essen-
tially, they were internationally organized attempts at transferring
the burden of adjustments from exporting countries to consumers.
The restriction schemes on wheat, sugar, tea, tin and rubber are typical
of this orientation. Interested countries combined to set up a mo-
nopoly or near-monopoly over world market supplies. Government
authority insured the enforcement of the plans on individual producers.
By export regulation, often reinforced by output control, supply and
demand were equated at a price level acceptable to producers. By
restricting new supplies, world surplus stocks were gradually liqui-
dated, and prices rose in response. By maintaining artificially the
necessary degree of scarcity, the price level was prevented from de-
clining again. Sometimes control was e-xtended over stocks and new
productive capacity, and the 1942 Draft Convention for an interna-
tional wheat agreement-fairly bristling with restrictions-added the
fixing of basic minimum and maximum prices to the duties of the
control body.
Like international cartels, these intergovernmental schemes had
varied success in terms of their own objectives. In this sense, the
International Wheat Agreement of 1931, the Chadbourne Sugar
Agreement of 1931, and the International Sugar Agreement of 1937
were failures, while the Tea Regulation Scheme of 1931, the Interna-
tional Tin Control Scheme of 1931, and the International Rubber
Regulation Agreement of 1934 were definitely successful from the
viewpoint of their sponsors. The former controls collapsed because
they did not enjoy a sufficient degree of monopoly power or because
not all member countries conformed to the control decisions. They
dealt with commodities whose production is spread over the world
and can easily be extended by protective devices. To be effective, the
interests of too many governments and producers had to be reconciled.
By contrast, production of the commodities of the second group is
geographically concentrated, relatively few producing countries are
involved, and the industries themselves are characterized by a some-
what greater extent of financial integration than are wheat or sugar
production.
The general effects of prewar commodity agreements were roughly
the same as those of private international cartels that followed com-
parable methods of output and export control.0 Employing restrictive
techniques, these intergovernmental schemes tended to raise cost and
price levels, to diminish the volume of trade, and to freeze it in existing
channels. Provided they did not collapse, they succeeded in securing
29. See KNoRR, TIN UNDER CONTROL (1945) 214-52; KNoRR, WoRLD RuBBn AND
ITs REGULATION (1945) 155-75.
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better incomes to producers at the expense, very largely, of final con-
sumers. In fact, the loss of the latter exceeded the gain to the former.
This resulted directly from the fact that these arrangements refrained
from attacking the root cause of the trouble. Instead of eliminating
extramarginal producers more speedily and less painfully than the
competitive process was apt to do, these controls preserved excess
capacity and protected the value of malinvestments. In principle,
output restriction was applied on the basis of arithmetic equality to
efficient and inefficient producers alike. The structure of the industries
was not readapted to average market requirements, allowing for rea-
sonable reserve capacity. Continued prosperity, therefore, was left to
rest on the perpetuation of international restriction. To shift the costs
of this superficial remedy to the importing countries and consumers,
to subordinate considerations of general welfare to the special interests
of limited groups, did not prove difficult since these arrangements were
created and operated by producing interests and exporting countries.
The mere involvement of governments did not make these controls
essentially different from private cartels.
This analysis cannot be invalidated by references to tenuous in-
stances of consumer representation, to the fact that quota agreements
can adjust supplies upwards as well as downwards, or to the alleged
attempt of control bodies to manipulate no more than a "fair" price
for the commodity. The rubber and tin schemes provided for a few
consumer representatives. But they represented solely the interests
of industrial consumers; they enjoyed only advisory rights, and they
had no dependable influence over control policy. Undoubtedly, control
authorities adjusted the flow of supplies to changing market require-
ments, and they increased supplies when requirements expanded. But
they equated supply and demand at a price which in the long run was
higher than would have evolved in a free market after amputation of
surplus production facilities.30 Too often they did not increase supplies
fast enough in a rising market. The "controllers" had to engage in the
speculative business of forecasting demand volumes many months
ahead and, obviously, they tried to minimize the risk of fixing an
excessive rate of supply by underestimating rather than overestimating
future requirements.
Under conditions of control, the notion of a "fair" price involves
arbitrary assumptions. It cannot be reduced to precise criteria. Ulti-
mately, the price level actually manipulated represents a political
price arrived at through bargaining between different producing inter-
ests and influenced by a variety of considerations such as the actual or
potential menace of outside rivals and the desire to avoid international
30. Mason, ThU Future of Commodity Agreements in ScrumTz (ed.), FOOD FOR T11F
WORLD (1945) 230.
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ill-will.3' But the institutional ability to rig prices to a very high level
represents a perennial temptation not always easy to resist. The In-
ternational Tin Committee, for example, exhibited far less moderation
than the Rubber Committee. If the International Tea Agreement has
a comparatively excellent record, this was the result of the participating
countries representing at the same time the chief producing and con-
suming interests.3 2 However, to call the supply policy of the Tea
Committee moderate is not to say that the scheme was bare of the
restrictive features and effects objectionable on general grounds. Nor
can the Draft Convention for a future international wheat agreement
escape this basic criticism. Formulated in 1942 and widely publicized
as a sort of model for postwar control schemes, it is studded with re-
strictive measures. 3
It is clear that prewar intergovernmental commodity agreements
were not a desirable form of international economic cooperation. They
ran counter to the rule that a remedy must not, in its general effects,
be worse than the evil it is supposed to mitigate. They violated the
overriding principle that interference with the free market must not
substantially hinder the rise of world real income. The contention
that, as compared with cartels, the participation of governments
introduces interests broader than those of solely producer-orientated
controls is not supported by the record. There are those who make a
virtue of this fact and those who find excuses for it. Some candidly
defend these agreements as government-supported monopolistic con-
trols intended to force an equitable redistribution of income in favor
of the farmer and to secure for the unorganized primary producer some
of the monopoly gains hitherto pocketed by industrial producers and
organized labor. Others find excuses in the underlying conditions of
the interwar period when world economic collaboration was at such a
low ebb that a constructive international solution was impracticable
and nearly every country pursued a beggar-my-neighbor policy.
Admittedly, primary producers and countries exporting raw mate-
rials nursed legitimate grievances. They had a righ to demand relief
from a problem which was international in scope. Not only were many
individual industries and countries affected immediately, they also
became sources of economic maladjustment from which disturbing
tendenciesspread to the world economic structure. The problem was
international; so had to be its solution. At best, national self-help
could in some countries ameliorate the crisis, albeit at considerable
social costs. Intergovernmental restriction schemes were no more than
31. Over the short term, of course, prices were influenced by errors of control policy
and remained susceptible to general cyclical forces.
32. See VICNIZER, TEA UNDER IxTERNATrONAL REGuLATion (1944) 110.
33. See Davis, New Interniona2 Wheat Agreemnts (1942) 19 WHEAT STUDIEs OF TUC
FOOD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, STANFORD UiwEvsrsrzy 25, 42 el seg.
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a form of coordinated self-help among exporting countries. They were
approved by the international conferences5 of the 1930's 14 because no
better solution was feasible in a disorganized world. Will there be a
better one in the future?
The future complexion of the problem of chronic surpluses will be
determined largely by the general political, economic and institutional
environment of the postwar world. Should trade barriers be substan-
tially reduced, discriminatory practices abolished, and a high degree
of international monetary stability achieved, one perennial cause of
surplus output capacity would be automatically obviated. The dupli-
cation of productive facilities as a result of protective devices would
decrease. Should the key industrial countries succeed in confining the
fluctuations of the business cycle within relatively narrow bounds, raw
commodity prices should be far more stable than before and average
absorption should greatly expand. The establishment of international
study groups for the most important primary products should facilitate
constant consultation among governments and permit the systematic
gathering, interpretation and dissemination of facts relevant to indus-
tries and markets. Consultation and precise information can do much
to prevent overinvestment and the temporary shortages which, through
high prices, are apt to.promote overexpansion.
The problem of chronic surpluses would not disappear under such
conditions. It would find less widespread expression, and, in an ex-
pansive environment, the shift of resources from overexpanded to
expandable industries would be facilitated. But the quest for specific
remedies would be renewed whenever an important primary industry
found itself confronted with chronic surpluses. Such situations are
likely to be particularly numerous during the postwar transition period.
Just as after the first World War, many industries will be overexpanded
in relation to normal peacetime requirements. What action should be
contemplated to meet this problem?
There are those devotees to international planning who advocate
the prewar type of commodity agreement in preference to leaving
critical industries exposed to the competitive market. But the choice
need not be limited to the two alternatives. The goal is an instrument
of economic adaptation superior to both. Recognizing that restriction
schemes injure consumers' interests, some planners propose to reform
these controls by according equal authority over them to importing
and exporting countries. But even if this arrangement should protect
consumers against extreme abuse of monopoly power, it would do
nothing to alter the restrictive nature of the device. As before, inter-
governmental commodity agreements would preserve excess capacity,
34. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, RAW-MATERIAL PROBLEMS AND POLICIES (1946) 76-7.
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protect high-cost producers, obstruct economic progress and diminish
trade.
To be constructive and in keeping ith an expansive world economy,
planning must extend to the crux of the problem. It must center on the
removal of surplus productive capacity-the locus of maladjustment.
The job is not to prevent change, to resist the corrective forces of the
competitive market, and to ban the shifting of unemployed resources
to more remunerative fields of employment. The problem is to make
the needed changes proceed smoothly and to speed up capacity con-
traction and resource transfer without exposing the entire industry to
protracted income depression. To be practicable, on the other hand,
planning must not shun compromise. There is no sense in projecting
a quick surgical operation to which the patients cannot be made to
submit. Some restriction will be the inevitable part of regulation ac-
ceptable to diverse interests. The important thing is to subordinate
such restriction to the ultimately expansive endeavor and to keep it
at a minimum in extent and time.
It is not too difficult to set down the principles of an adequate pro-
gram. (1) To permit of truly international remedies, a code of rules
and procedure must be formulated and machinery provided for its
application. (2) Action should commence preferably before the surplus
situation has become critical. (3) Increased consumption must form
the first line of attack. (4) If absorption remains insufficient, the
inflated industry must be readapted to world consumption capacity in
an orderly manner. (5) Such readjustment should comprise the dis-
investment of redundant and sub-marginal producing units and allow
structural changes in the direction of economic resource utilization.
(6) If output and export regulation is indispensable to orderly read-
justment, such restrictive control must be confined to important
primary industries; it must be strictly limited in time, and it must
afford ample protection of consumers' interests.
This is indeed the general approach of the United States Trade
Proposals. Members of the projected International Trade Organiza-
tion are urged to adopt the following procedure. Member countries
principally interested in the production or consumption of a raw
commodity, of which excess supplies exist or are threatened, will
undertake a special study with the view to expanding consumption.
"If it is concluded, in the light of an investigation of the root
causes of the problem, that measures for increasing the consump-
tion of a commodity are unlikely to operate quickly enough to pre-
vent excess supplies of the commodity from accumulating, the
members may ask the Organization to convene an intergovernmen-
tal conference for the purpose of framing an intergovernmental
commodity agreement for the commodity concerned." 35
35. U. S. TP_&E PRorosALs 20.
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Three principles are to govern the institutions of such agreements.
First, consuming as well as producing countries "should be entitled
to participate in the consideration of the proposed agreement." 11
Secondly, arrangements involving the limitation of production or
exports or the allocation of markets should not be undertaken unless
(a) "a burdensome surplus of the product concerned has developed
or is developing in international trade and is accompanied by
widespread distress to small producers accounting for a sub-
stantial proportion of the total output and that these conditions
cannot be corrected by the normal play of competitive forces
because, in the case of the product concerned, a substantial re-
duction of price leads neither to a significant increase in con-
sumption nor to a significant decrease in production . . . ; "31
or
(b) "widespread unemployment, unrelated to general business
conditions, has developed or is developing in respect of the in-
dustry concerned and that such unemployment cannot be cor-
rected by the normal play of competitive forces rapidly enough
to prevent widespread and undue hardship to workers because,
in the case of the industry concerned, i) a substantial reduction
of price does not lead to a significant increase in consumption
but leads, instead, to the reduction of employment, and ii) the
resulting unemployment cannot be remedied by normal proc-
esses of reallocation. . ... 3
The former case obviously refers to agricultural industries of the
owner-operator type, the latter mostly to large-scale mineral industries.
In either case, such controls are to be applied only when "the need is
real and serious, affecting many people. . . ." 11 Thirdly, members
must formulate and adopt a program of economic adjustment believed
adequate to insure substantial progress toward removing "the root
causes of the problem." 40
Restrictive control, then, is "to provide a period of transition which
will afford opportunities for the orderly solution of particular com-
modity problems by agreement . upon a program of over-all
economic adjustments designed to promote a shift of resources and
manpower out of over-expanded industries into new and productive
occupations." 41 The purpose is not to protect vested interests but to
effect change along an orderly pattern. For this reason, controls
"should be strictly temporary, lasting no longer than required to carry
36. Id. at 21.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id. at 21.
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out the necessary shifts." 42 Initially, agreements should not remain
in effect for more than five years, renewal being subject to certain
definite rules. For their protection, consuming countries are to have a
voice in the regulation of prices, trade, stocks, or production, "equal
to those largely interested in obtaining export markets for their pro-
duction.'' 43 Furthermore, there must be "provisions for assuring the
availability of supplies adequate at all times for world consumption
requirements at reasonable prices." 44
Compared with prewar commodity agreements, this plan appears
felicitous in conception. One commentator indeed speaks of the
"almost clinical purity" of its approach.45 However, it is clear that
these proposals are barely more than general statements of principle.
It is perhaps overly pragmatic to believe that "the proof of any prin-
ciple is in its application," -1 but the record of international economic
cooperation is replete with instances of disregard and violation in
practice of agreed principles. One trouble is that the principles in
question are capable of widely varying interpretation, another that
their application becomes difficult in direct proportion to the rigor with
which they are interpreted. These dangers can be easily exemplified
by referring to the problems of (1) recognizing the necessity of con-
certed intervention in a commodity market; (2) planning expanded
consumption; (3) formulating adequate readjustment plans; (4) limit-
ing the duration of restrictive controls; and (5) affording sufficient pro-
tection to consumers' interests.
(1) Necessity of concerted interention. As stated previously, the
number of intergovernmental commodity arrangements should be
kept to a minimum because of their unavoidably restrictive effects.
It is intended to confine such schemes predominantly to basic food-
stuffs and raw materials, their application to fabricated products being
limited to "exceptional circumstances." 41 International investigation
and consultation are to start when excess supplies prevail or are
threatened. No criteria are offered for recognizing the existence of
such conditions. This is indeed impracticable since different commodity
markets have peculiar characteristics. In some markets, the accumu-
lation of visible supplies may furnish ample evidence, but in general it
is prices in relation to cost trends which must be taken as the starting
42. Id. at 6.
43. Id. at 22.
44. Ibid.
45. The Trade Proposals, supra note 26, at 854.
416. U. S. TRADE PROPosALs 3.
47. The pressure for intergovernmental restriction on manufactures will obviously ba
great if the restrictive practices of private international business agreements are effectively
curbed.
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point, for a surplus situation may exist, expressed in very low prices,
in the absence of excess visible stocks.
Intergovernmental control agreements are planned only if burden-
some commodity surpluses lead to widespread distress to small pro-
ducers or to widespread unemployment unrelated to general business
conditions and if in either case the normal play of competitive forces
fails to rectify the situation within a reasonable period of time. Both
price responsiveness of consumption and resistance to disinvestment
and resource shift are capable of fairly precise measurement. Difficulties
will arise in diagnosing the "wide spread" of distress and unemploy-
ment. What if these phenomena are exhibited, because of high costs
or the specific nature of the product, predominantly in one important
producing country or only in a number of smaller ones? What if these
phenomena are not engendered in some countries because of domestic
price-support programs? What if, in mining industries, a surplus
situation finds its expression in declining wages rather than in large-
scale unemployment which is more likely to develop where wage costs
are incapable of compression? It seems reasonable to assume that
the planners will focus their attention on net-exporting countries and
will consider introducing a readjustment and restriction scheme only
if the signs of distress are visible in those major countries of this cate-
gory which do not subsidize their exporters or producers.
Yet inevitably a great deal of discretion will be left to the investigat-
ing and planning body, and much will therefore depend upon their
wisdom, authority, and good will. This impression is reinforced if the
problem of timing is considered. The earlier an emerging industrial
malady is diagnosed and treated, the easier it is to create relief by
expanding consumption and to remedy basic maladjustments. Such
laudable preoccupation, however, encompasses the danger that once
the machinery is set in motion it cannot be stopped before it has run
its full course; the danger, in other words, is that there will be too many
restrictive agreements. The problem of timing extends to the effects of
cyclical market disturbances. When general business conditions are
brisk, the fact of redundant production capacity may not be fully
appreciated since it is believed that with a little additional increase of
consumption it will disappear. Nothing will be done. When business
contracts, the problem of surplus capacity is overlaid by that of cycli-,
cal oversupply, and the trouble assumes formidable dimensions.4" Cor-
rective planning, moreover, is greatly facilitated when undertaken in
times of general business expansion.
(2) Planning expanded consumption. It is an excellent idea that
expansive measures should precede restrictive ones in mitigating a
surplus situation. New uses as well as established outlets should be
48. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, op. cit. supra note 34, at 80.
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canvassed for possible consumption increases. In wealthy countries,
absorption may be expandable in processed form (e.g., wheat used for
feed). Importing countries may be persuaded to slash revenue taxes
(e.g., on coffee). Most important perhaps is the diffusion of abundance
to economically less developed and poverty-stricken areas. Two-price
systems or special joint loans might well be considered in order to
supply countries without adequate purchasing power to satisfy their
needs at world market prices."9 The International Tea Committee,
for example, stimulated a doubling of Indian tea consumption by
advertising and the fixing of an Indian tea price substantially below
the world market price. Complex problems will doubtless be met in
applying such ideas on a broad scale. Thus far, there is no agreed
body of doctrine on how to apply them in international concert. The
problem is to combine all the ingenuity displayed in national subsidy
and international restriction programs and put it behind a constructive
purpose.
(3) Formulating readjustment plans. Restrictive commodity agree-
ments are bad. The essence of restoring health to an industry depressed
on account of surplus productive facilities is to readjust its structure.
To make the adjustment proceed in an orderly fashion, without plung-
ing the entire industry into prolonged distress, is the sole constructive
purpose of temporary suspension of the free market. The desirability
of the scheme proposed by the United States stands or falls with the
implementation of effective plans of industrial readaptation. This is
the heart of the program and its most difficult part. Not all producers
can survive. Vhere excess capacity is the root of the trouble, it cannot
be left intact. It must be amputated and, as the Proposals insist,
such capacity contraction should follow economic lines by eliminating
submarginal producers from the industry.
The formulation of an effective plan is vastly complicated by the
fact that inefficient producing units are not equally distributed among
the various producing countries. Sometimes, as in the case of tin
(Bolivia) or sugar (the beet sugar countries), a country's industry as a
whole may be distinctly high-cost. To proceed economically, there-
fore, unequal degrees of painful adjustment must be expected from
different countries. Since the agreement and consent of these countries
is essential to a concerted plan, it is clear that there must be at least a
partial sharing of such unequal burdens. International cooperation,
help, and compensation is needed especially where the industry con-
cerned forms an important portion of the entire economy.
Provided the demand for the commodity concerned exhibits secular
growth and capacity redundancy is not extreme, adjustment can be
achieved by a gradual dismantling or lowering of producer subsidies
49. FEIS, THE SiNEws OF PEACE (1944) 247.
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in all forms. Agreements to abandon export bounties and perhaps
preferential tariff arrangements and import-quota protection, to
reduce tariffs, and to limit or discontinue price-support programs-all
indicating the presence of inefficient production-may be sufficient to
bring an industry back to health.50 Other industries will call for a
more radical plan of selective retrenchment covering large segments in
exporting countries to whose economy the industry is of vital concern.
This involves particular difficulties in economically less advanced
countries. The active facilitation of resource transfer on a large scale
is an obvious prerequisite. The state of other industries must be con-
sidered. Financial and technical assistance must be forthcoming,
workers must be resettled and retrained, farmers reequipped, and
industrialization promoted. Such project need not only be mapped
out but also must be financed in cooperation.
To state the problems is to state the complexity and dimension of
the task. In nearly every individual case, capacity contraction may
appear to conflict with other aims of economic policy such as full-
employment programs or attempts at reducing dependence on foreign
supplies. Farmers and laborers are prone to resent and resist their
shift to other occupations. Investors will do their utmost to prevent
capital losses. Enforcement will be troublesome wherever a multitude
of producers is involved. Other problems will be posed by export,
output and, possibly, price control. To provide an additional incentive
toward optimum adjustment and, generally, to "make appropriate
provision to afford increasing opportunities for satisfying world re-
quirements from sources from which such requirements can be supplied
most effectively." 61 Equalitarian restriction, as practised by prewar
schemes, must give way to non-equalitarian restriction becoming in-
creasingly severe on high-cost and easier on low-cost sources of supply,
Prices must remain relatively low in order to encourage the growth of
consumption and limit inter-commodity competition.
(4) Duration of restrictive controls. Under the United States Pro-
posals, intergovernmental commodity agreements are conceived as
transitional expedients. Hence the emphasis that, when set up, con-
trols of this sort "should be strictly temporary, lasting no longer than
required to carry out the necessary shifts." 52 The length of the period
depends, of course, on the magnitude of basic maladjustment and will
be affected by the peculiarities of different industries. It must be
neither too short nor too long. If it is too brief, the lasting success of
the readjustment plan may be jeopardized; if too long, restriction
50. See Haley, United States Policy Regarding Commodity Agreements (1945) 12 D.,'T
oF STAiE BULL. 638, 642.
51. U. S. TRADE PROPosALs 22.
52. Id. at 6.
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ceases to fulfill a useful function. To set the right length will require
the most judicious appraisal.
According to the Proposals, agreements are not to remain initially
in force for more than five years. Renewal should be subject to the
principles governing the formation of new agreements (the existence
of a distress situation as defined) and to the additional rule that "either
substantial progress toward a solution of the underlying problem shall
have been accomplished during the initial period of the agreement or
that the renewed agreement is so revised as to be effective for this
purpose." -3 The wording of the last clause is apt to arouse serious
doubt and suspicion. Instead of furnishing an additional incentive
toward the speedy reorganization of a depressed industry by setting a
definite time limit on the duration of transitional restriction, it seems
to do the opposite. A readjustment scheme must, of course, be elabor-
ated-on paper. But if it is not executed, in which case the abandon-
ment of control would automatically precipitate the distress situation
that necessitated an agreement in the first place, restrictive control
can be renewed by simply elaborating a revised adjustment scheme--
on paper. This provision, therefore, invites procrastination on the
primary purpose of intergovernmental control. Unless revised, it must
be regarded as an escape clause permitting the indefinite perpetuation
of restriction while defeating constructive change. The danger that
removal of "temporary" restriction is indefinitely postponed must be
forestalled. Analogous cases of protective devices intended to be tem-
porary but hardly ever lifted; such as emergency and infant-industry
tariffs, demonstrate how real the danger is.14
(5) Protecting consumer interests. Contrary to prevar agreements,
the new arrangements provide for full participation of countries chiefly
or solely interested as importers and consumers of the commodity con-
cerned. They are to have a voice, equal to exporting countries, in the
formation and administration of controls. Commodity agreements,
furthermore, are to be so operated as to make available at all times
and at "reasonable prices" supplies adequate to satisfy world con-
sumption requirements and to allow for a progressively larger flow of
supplies from low-cost sources of supply. Provisions for the periodical
review of, and for full publicity on, the operation of the agreements
may also be regarded as safeguards of the consumers' interest.
Nevertheless, the issue of consumers' protection presents both prac-
tical and theoretical difficulties. There is the practical problem of
avoiding deadlocks in administering controls when importing and
exporting countries possess equal power." There is the problem of
53. Id. at 22.
54. LEAGUE oF NATiONS, op. cit. supra note 34, at 79.
55. FEIs, op. cit. supra note 49, at 245.
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who should bear the risk of faulty control decisions resulting in ill
effects on producers and exporting nations. There is the problem of
dependably assuring the availability of adequate supplies at all times,
a condition which in most cases can be satisfied only by the creation of
ample reserve stocks. There is, finally, the fundamental problem of
how to protect the ultimate consumer in a world in which he alone of
all interested parties is unorganized and therefore incapable of making
his weight felt in the political process.
One thing is clear. The interest of the industrial consumer and proc-
essor-largely determined by the financial risks of holding working
stocks-does not coincide with that of the final consumers."6 Unor-
ganized, the latter cannot be represented by their own delegates.
Representation by government is the only feasible alternative. How-
ever, for the greater number of foodstuffs and industrial materials, most
importing countries are also producing countries and they are high-cost
producing countries wherever protection is accorded in one form or
other, which is the rule rather than the exception. By necessity, their
governments represent the interests of both their home producers,
usually organized, and their consumers, usually unorganized. Be the
interest of the latter ever so much greater than that of the former,
governments in response to pressure tend to favor the organized as
against the unorganized group.17 Despite equal representation of im-
porting and exporting countries in control schemes, the prospects are
that producers' interests will on balance be more strongly represented
than consumers' interests.
These five problems discussed above are examples of the difficulties
to be met in the actual establishment and administration of inter-
governmental commodity agreements. They could easily be multiplied.
But they suffice to indicate that the proposal and acceptance of ex-
cellent general principles is only a first step. The real task lies in their
application. It would be misleading to hold out the hope that the
spirit of the Proposals is bound to come to fruition. Most important
trading countries have favored commodity agreements of the exclu-
sively restrictive prewar type. To name Great Britain, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, France, Canada, Australia, Argentina and Brazil is
only to mention the more important ones. Yet the most ominous fact
is the record of the United States itself. There is in the American
record no principled and consistent opposition to governmental re-
striction schemes as there is to private cartels. To be sure, it would be
in the enlightened interest of the United States to lead the fight against
restriction for, on balance, the country is a net-importer of primary
56. See KNORR, WORLD RUBBER AND ITs REGULATION 173-5; KNORR, TIN UNDER
CONTROL 244-7.
57. See FISHER, EcoNoMIc PROGRESS AND SOCIAL SECURITY (1945) 285.
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products. Admittedly, the United States has looked askance at the
schemes for rubber and tin, commodities of which it was not a producer.
Also, the drafting of the Proposals here discussed is e-vidence of clear
thinking among government planners.
But there are counteracting factors. The United States has favored
restrictive agreements on wheat of which it is a producer. It was the
primary driving force in framing the 1942 Draft Convention for an
international wheat agreement which would hardly fit the pattern of
the Proposals. Similarly, the pressure and aspirations of the cotton
and wool interests make it doubtful that the country's attitude toward
cotton and wool schemes would be in keeping with the guiding prin-
ciples of the Proposals. It is equally doubtful that the United States
would make an "expansive" contribution toward the solution of the
world sugar problem. The unpalatable fact is that United States prac-
tice regarding tariffs, export bounties, and domestic price-support
programs for agricultural products is out of line with the object of
adaptive rather than restrictive commodity agreements. Such incom-
patibility of orientation is reflected in the varying attitude taken
among different government departments toward commodity agree-
ments. The Department of Agriculture, for example, labors too much
under the preoccupation with surplus farm products to permit itself
the interest in overall principles displayed by the Department of State.
Congressional leanings can be easily imagined. This country cannot,
on the one hand, insist on purity of approach toward commodities in
which it is interested only as an importer and, on the oth-er hand, show
zest in compromising with evil when its interests as a high-cost produc-
ing country are at stake. The danger is that it will unify its policy by
adopting restrictionism all around.
There are three salient reasons, then, why the curbing of restrictive
policies of international cartels is more likely to enjoy success than the
framing of intelligent commodity agreements. First, the American
attitude is as ambivalent toward governmental commodity schemes
as it is strongly and unambiguously anti-cartel. Second, primary in-
dustries composed of numerous producers and hence unsuitable to
private cartelization will be able, in this phase of history, to exert far
more political pressure than industries composed of a handful of large
concerns. And they will press for painless relief through price-support
programs pure and simple and resist change if it hurts. Third, banning
a few clearly definable business practices in mass-production industries
is infinitely less complex than reorganizing entire industries involving
thousands or millions of producers and many countries. The former
task is relatively simple and of a type most governments are adept to
perform. The latter requires sophisticated perception of multitudinous
facts, political wisdom and incorruptibility of principle-all to a degree
uncommon among modern governments.
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There is no cause for defeatism. No policy is incapable of change,
but it is well to realize that change is often slow. To see the obstacles
in the way of intelligent commodity agreements is a step in the right
direction. It shows the need for widespread diffusion of information
and public guidance as well as for the right kind of government plan-
ning.
To sum up: the United States proposals on international cartels
look disappointing at first sight but gain respect on further considera-
tion. The proposals on intergovernmental commodity agreements
appear excellent in theory, but it is difficult to visualize these principles
translated into practice.
